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INTRODUCTION
International commercial arbitration's rising popularity as a
mode of dispute resolution increasingly forces arbitral tribunals to
reconcile the friction created when foreign parties bring divergent le-
gal cultures to a single legal proceeding.' Ironically, international
commercial arbitration's pervasiveness is partly due to the fact that
foreign parties can agree to apply multiple legal codes to a single legal
dispute. 2 When a party petitions a particular country's court to recog-
nize and enforce an award rendered using another country's law, fric-
tion arises. As this Note will explain, the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New
York Convention) and several judicial decisions have helped guide
U.S. courts when parties seek to recognize and enforce arbitral awards
rendered using non-U.S. and contradictory law. No court decision or
scholarly piece, however, has addressed the course of action a court
should take if asked to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award
rendered using Islamic law. Yet U.S. courts will have to develop a satis-
factory response to such requests, as the rapid growth of Islamic fi-
nance will undoubtedly lead parties dealing in Islamic financial
instruments to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign awards
rendered using Islamic law (particularly Islamic financial law) in the
United States.
This Note will examine how a U.S. court should approach recog-
nition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under the New
York Convention where the parties chose Islamic law as the governing
law. A court's chosen course of action will necessarily implicate issues
such as the state action doctrine, due process, equal protection, the
political question doctrine, and the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause. This Note aims to prescribe the most effective approach a
court may take when dealing with an award rendered in the interna-
tional commercial arbitration setting that uses Islamic and other relig-
ious law, advancing a three-step process. First the court should use
the doctrine of separability to determine exactly which parts of the
I See TIBOR VARADY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A TRANsNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVE 6-12 (4th ed. Supp. 2009).
2 See INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION AND ADR RuLEs art. 21 (2011)
("The parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied by the arbitral
tribunal to the merits of the dispute."); VARADY ET AL., supta note 1.
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arbitration applied religious law (e.g., the procedural law, the eviden-
tiary law, the arbitral law, or the substantive law). Second, the court
should institute a waiver rule at the recognition and enforcement
stage regarding objections relating to procedural, evidentiary, or arbi-
tral law issues. In limited cases, a U.S. court should undertake due
process and equal protection analyses to determine if any constitu-
tional violations occurred during the arbitral proceedings or if recog-
nizing and enforcing the foreign arbitral award would contravene U.S.
constitutional rights.
This Note is divided into seven parts. Part I describes the New
York Convention. Part II explains certain aspects of Islamic law that
would be relevant at the recognition and enforcement stage. Part III
provides a brief overview of views toward Islamic law in the United
States. Part IV describes the increasing popularity of Islamic finance
as a mechanism for conducting financial transactions, which impli-
cates the importance of Islamic commercial law. Part V outlines the
particular facets of Islamic law that would create tensions and dilem-
mas at the recognition and enforcement stage in a U.S. court. Part VI
explores three possible, but ultimately flawed, approaches a U.S. court
could use when confronted with a foreign arbitral award rendered us-
ing Islamic law. Lastly, Part VII prescribes a three-step approach that
could minimize many of the problems associated with recognizing
and enforcing a foreign arbitral award rendered using Islamic or
other religious law.
I
THE NEW YORK CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDs
The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards is an international treaty that the vast ma-
jority of countries have signed.3 Signatories to the treaty include the
United States and most countries in the Muslim world.4 The treaty
allows parties seeking to enforce an arbitral award rendered in one
member country to have that award recognized and enforced in an-
other member country.5 Arbitration is the preferred method for set-
tling international disputes that involve parties from different nations
3 See VARADY ET AL., supra note 1.
4 See id.; Charles N. Brower & Jeremy IL Sharpe, Note, International Arbitration and the
Islamic World: The Third Phase, 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 643, 647 (2003) (observing that as of 2003
roughly two-thirds of the Organization of Islamic Countries' nation-members are parties to
the New York Convention).
5 See generally United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards,June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention]
(providing procedures, exceptions, and conditions under which signatories agree to en-
force foreign arbitral awards).
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because awards are easily recognized and enforced abroad, especially
when compared to the more uncertain and cumbersome process of
seeking recognition and enforcement of a judgment rendered in a
foreign country's domestic courts.6 If a party seeks recognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award rendered by a New York Convention
country in another New York Convention member-country tribunal,
that party can be sure that the latter country will apply the New York
Convention.7 However, if the same party seeks recognition and en-
forcement of a foreign judgment, an agreement between the judg-
ment-rendering country and the country where recognition and
enforcement is sought will dictate whether the award will be recog-
nized and enforced; if no such agreement exists, the domestic law of
the country where the party seeks recognition and enforcement will
dictate whether the award is recognized and enforced.8 The latter ap-
proach is less streamlined and creates more uncertainty for parties
seeking to resolve a dispute with an international dimension.9
Article V of the New York Convention includes a limited number
of exceptions that allow a foreign court to vacate an award.10 For ex-
ample, Article V(1) (b) provides that a court can withhold recognition
and enforcement of an award if a party was "unable to present his
case" during the arbitral proceedings." Courts interpret this provi-
sion to withhold recognition and enforcement when parties were de-
nied the opportunity to present their case (e.g., material evidence was
not allowed to be introduced).1 2 Article V(1) (d) states that a court
can vacate an award if the "arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties."13 This provision allows a court to
6 See Elana Levi-Tawil, Note, East Meets West: Introducing Sharia into the Rules Governing
International Arbitrations at the BCDR-AAA, 12 CARoozo J. CONFuct REsoL. 609, 612-16
(2011) (detailing the history of international commercial arbitration and the enforceabil-
ity of foreign arbitral awards); Kristin T. Roy, Note, The New York Convention and Saudi
Arabia: Can a Country Use the Public Policy Defense to Refuse Enforcement of Non-Domestic Arbitral
Awards?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 920, 926-28 (1995) (noting the advantages of international
arbitration as compared to litigation in foreign domestic court).
7 New York Convention, supra note 5, art. I.
8 SeeJ. Noelle Hicks, Note, Facilitating International Trade: The U.S. Needs Federal Legis-
lation Governing the Enforcement of Foreign judgments, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 155, 165-66
(2002); Roy, supra note 6, at 926-28 (exploring the public policy exception to the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judgments under the Brussels Convention).
9 See Charles Platto & William G. Horton, Preface to ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDG-
MENTS WORLDWIDE, at xi, xi (Charles Platto & William G. Horton eds., 2d ed. 1993) ("[T] he
enforcement of foreign judgments remains one of the few fields in which there is no inter-
national governing convention."). For example, in the United States, "state law governs
the enforcement of foreign judgments, thus creating a sense of uncertainty for foreigners."
Hicks, supra note 8, at 160.
10 See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V.
11 See id. art. V(1)(b).
12 See id.
13 See id. art. V(1)(d).
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vacate an award where the parties chose a specific law to govern the
dispute but the arbitrator based his or her decision on another legal
code.14 Also under this provision, a court may refuse recognition and
enforcement where the composition of the arbitral tribunal was in-
consistent with the parties' agreement.15
Article V(2) (b) provides an additional exception that either the
parties or the court can raise.16 This exception allows the court to
vacate an arbitral award when "recognition or enforcement of the
award would be contrary to the public policy of [the forum] coun-
try."7 U.S. courts have interpreted the public policy exception to ap-
ply when an award's recognition and enforcement would offend "the
forum state's most basic notions of morality andjustice."1' The public
policy exception is unavailable in situations where the award's recog-
nition and enforcement is merely contrary to the forum state's "na-
tional political interests."' 9
Parties who raise the public policy exception are seldom success-
ful because U.S. policy generally favors arbitration.20 Several U.S.
cases go so far as to suggest that it is contrary to U.S. public policy for
a court to fail to recognize and enforce a valid foreign arbitral
award.2 1 In the context of international financial disputes, the Su-
preme Court, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
stated that there is an "emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dis-
pute resolution."22 Hence, U.S. courts' interpretation of the New
York Convention calls for virtually automatic recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards.
14 See id.
15 See id.
16 See id. art. V(2)(b).
17 Id.
18 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974); Hicks, supra note 8, at 166-67.
19 Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 974.
20 See Michael C. Grossman, Is This Arbitration?: Religious Tfibunals, judicial Review, and
Due Process, 107 COLM. L. RFcv. 169, 176 (2007) (noting the "current policy ... that courts
should favor arbitration over litigation" (quotingJean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitu-
tionality of the Supreme Court's PNeference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment ofjury Trial,
Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1, 17 (1997)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
21 See, e.g., In reChromalloy Aeroservices, 939 F. Supp. 907, 913 (D.D.C. 1996) (noting
that a decision failing to enforce a foreign arbitral award "would violate ... clear U.S.
public policy").
22 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985).
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II
IsLAMIc LAw
A. Islamic Arbitral Law
Arbitration has been the preferred method of dispute resolution
since the beginning of Islam.23 Anyone qualified to be a qadi (Islamic
judge) is also qualified to arbitrate a dispute involving Islamic law. 2 4
Conversely, an arbitrator must also qualify as a qadi, which means that
in some schools of Islamic law, women and minorities cannot serve as
arbitrators.25 Additionally, Islamic arbitral law discourages parties
from using attorneys or representatives to argue their cases. 26
Particular aspects of Islamic arbitral law might force a U.S. court
to confront uncomfortable issues. If the arbitral tribunal was com-
posed in accordance with an interpretation of the qadi arbitrator rule
that prohibits women and minorities from serving as arbitrators, a
U.S. court may feel uncomfortable enforcing its award, despite the
New York Convention's instruction that an arbitral tribunal must be
composed in manner consistent with the parties' agreement.27 A U.S.
court may feel similarly uncomfortable enforcing an award where the
tribunal discouraged the parties from retaining counsel.28
Although arbitration has been prevalent throughout Islamic his-
tory for settling legal disputes," Muslim states and other entities have
only recently embraced international arbitration as a means to settle
commercial disputes.30 Former President of the International Court
of Justice Mohammed Bedjaoui explains the Arab world's recent ac-
ceptance of international arbitration as follows:
[T] he Arab world does not merely submit passively to [interna-
tional] arbitration, as imposed by its western partners in their con-
23 See Brower & Sharpe, supra note 4, at 643; Faisal Kutty, The Shari'a Factor in Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration, 28 Loy. L.A. INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 565, 589-96 (2006)
(describing the Middle East's long history of arbitration, dating back to the pre-Islamic
period).
24 See David S. Powers, Islamic Procedure Readings 55 (Sept. 21, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
25 See id.
26 See Caryn Litt Wolfe, Note, Faith-Based Arbitration: Friend or Foe? An Evaluation of
Religious Arbitration Systems and Their Interaction with Secular Courts, 75 FoRDHAM L. REv. 427,
464 (2006).
27 See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V.
28 See Lee Ann Bambach, The Enforceability of Arbitration Decisions Made by Muslim Relig-
ious Tribunals: Examining the Beth Din Precedent, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 379, 394 n.69
(2009-2010) (describing state arbitration statutes that make the right to an attorney a
nonwaivable statutory right).
29 See Mona Rafeeq, Note, Rethinking Islamic Law Arbitration Tribunals: Are They Compati-
ble with Traditional American Notions ofJustice?, 28 Wis. INT'L L.J. 108, 113-14 (2010)
(describing how arbitration has been preferred to litigation from the start of Islamic
history).
30 See Brower & Sharpe, supra note 4, at 656.
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tracts, but is rather an active proponent of the system, freely
adopting it in its intra-regional commercial relations. In such cases,
there is no external economic power which has imposed its will and
choice on Arab partners.3
Charles Brower and Jeremy Sharpe persuasively argue that Muslims
are now eager to embrace international commercial arbitration when
a financial dispute arises because it is a tool that provides the freedom
to choose the procedural and substantive law.32 In light of Islamic
finance's increasing popularity as a means to conduct international
business,33 the international community must ensure that Muslim
states and their nationals continue to embrace international commer-
cial arbitration.
B. Islamic Evidentiary Law
Certain facets of Islamic evidentiary law will create issues in U.S.
courts' enforcement of arbitral awards rendered using this law. For
example, according to many Islamic interpretations, legal testimony is
only acceptable from a witness who is classified as "religious."3 4 An
arbitral tribunal must determine whether a witness is an "upright" in-
dividual, whether that witness follows Sharia, and whether that witness
"abstains from sin."35 A witness's testimony is unacceptable if the wit-
ness stands to benefit from the outcome of the case or if the witness
has an interest in the case.36 Thus, a problem would arise at the rec-
ognition and enforcement stage if a U.S. court were asked to vacate a
foreign award under Article V(1) (b) because the arbitrator did not
allow the party to introduce material evidence and consequently de-
nied the party an opportunity to present its case.37
Another issue emerges if the parties chose Islamic law as the ap-
plicable evidentiary law and adopted an interpretation that holds a
woman's testimony to be equal to half of a man's testimony.38 In cases
involving financial disputes, Islamic law requires the testimony of two
31 See Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Arab World in ICC Arbitration, in THE ICC INT'L COURT
OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE ARAB COUN-
TREs 7, 13 (Supp. May 1992). Although the Bedjaoui quotation refers to the Arab em-
brace of international commercial arbitration, the quotation is equally applicable to the
rest of the Muslim world considering that the non-Arab Muslim world had a similar experi-
ence with external economic domination. See KAREN ARMSTRONG, IsLAM: A SHORT HisToRY
141-55, 178-80 (2000); Brower & Sharpe, supra note 4, at 647.
32 See Brower & Sharpe, supra note 4, at 655.
3 See infra Part IV.
34 David S. Powers, Islamic Evidence Readings 2 (Sept. 21, 2009) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).
35 Id.
36 See id. at 3.
37 See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(1) (b).
38 See Powers, supra note 34, at 4-5.
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men to establish a fact as proven.3 9 Following the above-described in-
terpretation of Islamic law would mean that four women would have
to testify to establish a fact in a case involving an Islamic financial dis-
pute. If an arbitrator accepts such an interpretation, then the arbitra-
tor, by default, accepts the notion that the testimony of one person is
inferior to others on the sole basis of sex. In the United States, this
acceptance would constitute an equal protection violation, 40 meaning
that a foreign tribunal's application of this interpretation would be
contrary to U.S. public policy.41 Various interpretations of the Quran,
however, state that adjudicators should treat male and female testi-
mony as equal.4 2 But, as explained below, a court would violate the
Establishment Clause by accepting one of these "liberal"
interpretations. 43
III
PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF ISLAMIc LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
Islamic law's apparent encroachment into the U.S. legal order is
continually pushed to the forefront of American political discourse.
In 2010, for example, those who opposed the proposed construction
of two mosques, one in lower Manhattan and one in Murfreesboro,
Tennessee, partially justified their opposition on the grounds that the
mosques would further the prevalence of Islamic law in the United
States. 44 In a suit seeking to block the mosque's construction, the re-
sidents of Murfreesboro stated that their community would be "irrepa-
rably harmed by the risk of terrorism generated by proselytising for
Islam and inciting the practices of [S]haria law."4 5 The residents
claimed that such a mosque would establish "Constitution-free zones"
where Islamic tribunals would exclusively apply Islamic law and im-
pose Islamic law penalties.4 6
Any politician or religious leader who suggests that Islamic law
has some role to play in resolving disputes between willing parties is
quickly rebuked for facilitating Islamic law's intrusion into his or her
country's secular legal order. For example, Archbishop Rowan Wil-
liams, leader of the Anglican Church, faced harsh criticism at home
39 See id. at 5.
40 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (finding that discrimination on the basis of
sex violates the Equal Protection Clause).
41 See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(2) (b).
42 See Powers, supra note 34, at 8.
43 See infra Part V.C.
44 See Islam in Tennessee: An Uncivil Action, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 2010, at 39, 39; see also
Muslims and McCarthyism, EcoNoMisT, Mar. 12, 2011, at 42, 42 (critiquing an "Is-
lamophobi[c]" decision of a House committee to hold security hearings that would focus
exclusively on Muslim Americans).
45 Islam in Tennessee: An Uncivil Action, supra note 44.
46 Id.
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and abroad for implying that Islamic law has a place in Britain's faith-
based dispute resolution system when parties voluntarily choose it?
Similarly, in Canada, Ontario's Premier rejected, after strong public
outcry, a 2005 proposal to incorporate Islamic faith-based arbitrations
into the already existing framework of faith-based arbitrations, which
includes Jewish and Christian mediation centers.48 Journalists and
scholars suggest that the mere mention of Islamic law creates such
knee-jerk reactions because Islamic law evokes images of beheadings
and stonings and conjures notions of a legal code that is fundamen-
tally incompatible with the rights of women and minorities.4 9
Such notions concerning Islamic law might help explain why
Oklahoma voters passed State Question 755 (also known as the Sharia
Amendment) by a vote of 70.08% to 29.9% in a November 2008 ballot
measure.50 Although the Sharia Amendment has not gone into effect,
it forbids Oklahoma courts "from considering or using international
law" and explicitly forbids the use of Islamic or Sharia law.5'
Lawmakers in six other states have proposed similar legislation.52 In
South Carolina, a legislator proposed a law that would prohibit courts
from "considerling] Sharia Law . . . and [enforcing] decisions of
courts or tribunals" using Sharia law.5 3
Although the probability that the Sharia Amendment or similar
laws would pass constitutional muster is very small,5 4 "the xenophobic
spirit of th[esel amendment[s] . . . is quite depressing."55 The pub-
lic's view of Islamic law in the American legal system is indeed "de-
pressing," because the debate focuses almost exclusively on the
invented threats posed by Islamic law overtaking the secular legal or-
der and does not focus on the real issues posed by accommodating
parties who voluntarily wish to apply Islamic law to their disputes. For
example, instead of examining whether a court should enforce a for-
eign arbitral award where an arbitrator applying Islamic law denied a
party the opportunity to present a witness because the witness had an
4 See Sharia in the West: Whose Law Counts Most?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2010, at 71, 71.
48 See Wolfe, supra note 26, at 428.
49 See Islamic Law and Democracy: Sense About Sharia, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2010, at 16,
16.
50 See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2010: Twenty-
Fourth Annual Survey, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 320 (2011).
51 See id.
52 See id.
53 See id. at 321.
54 Cf Amanda Bronstad, 10th Circuit Blocks Enforcement of Sharia Ban, NAT'L L.J., Jan.
10, 2012, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202538005267&10th-
Circuitblocksenforcement of Sharia-ban (subscription required) (reporting that the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has maintained the injunction blocking the
application of the Oklahoma amendment but that the district court has yet to reach a
decision on the merits).
5s See Symeonides, supra note 50, at 323.
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interest in the outcome, the public is concerned with whether enforc-
ing a judgment that used Islamic law will lead to stoning for adultery
and cutting off hands for theft.56 The latter concern is purely
imagined because it is impossible to fathom a U.S. court recognizing
and enforcing a foreign arbitral award imposing the type of Islamic
corporal penalties that only a few Muslim countries sanction.57 This
Note will focus on the real and foreseeable dilemmas posed when a
party asks a U.S. court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral
award rendered using Islamic law.
IV
THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF ISIAMIC FINANCE AND
BANKING IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE
Recent trends indicate that Islamic finance is becoming an in-
creasingly popular alternative to traditional or "Western" forms of in-
vestment and financial trading.58 Today, Sharia-compliant assets
equal "almost one trillion U.S. dollars globally."59 Financial experts
estimate that "[t]he potential market for Islamic financial products
could be as high as four trillion U.S. dollars."60 This growth is not just
limited to countries with overwhelmingly large Muslim populations,
but it also extends to Western countries such as the United States.6 '
Scholars suggest that Islamic finance's growing popularity may be due
to its emphasis on "responsible management"62 and "aversion to ex-
cessive risk."63
At its most basic, there are four principle rules that distinguish
Islamic commercial law from Western commercial law. 6 4 Under Is-
lamic law, financial deals must not involve interest (fiba), the parties
must not undertake "excessive risk-taking" (gharar), the parties must
not treat money as a commodity (i.e., a commodity cannot be sold
before it is delivered, and speculation is discouraged), and the value
of money cannot change with the passage of time.65
56 See, e.g., Blake Farmer, Fears About Shariah Law Take Hold in Tennessee, NPR (Sept. 3,
2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/09/03/159378918/fears-about-shariah-law-take-hold-in-
tennessee (recounting a recent incident of irrational fear of Sharia law in Tennessee).
57 See Islamic Law and Democracy: Sense About Sharia, supra note 49.
58 See Bashar H. Malkawi, Financial Derivatives in the West and in Islamic Finance: A Com-
parative Approach, 128 BANKING L.J. 50, 58 (2011); Julio C. Col6n, Note, Choice of Law and
Islamic Finance, 46 TEX. INT'L L.J. 411, 412-13 (2011).
59 See Col6n, supra note 58, at 412.
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See Holly E. Robbins, Note, Soul Searching and Profit Seeking: Reconciling the Competing
Goals of Islamic Finance, 88 TEX. L. REv. 1125, 1149 (2010).
64 See Malkawi, supra note 58, at 61.
65 See id.
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Islamic banking and financial transactions are often cross bor-
der.66 As such, parties to these transactions often turn to interna-
tional commercial arbitration as the principle means to resolve
disputes, given that this is the easiest method to enforce awards across
national borders.67 Many of the assets related to these disputes will be
in the United States, and parties will therefore undoubtedly seek rec-
ognition and enforcement of awards in the United States.68 Accord-
ingly, Islamic finance's expansion will inevitably force U.S. courts to
grapple with the question of whether recognizing and enforcing
awards where Islamic law provided the procedural and substantive law
violates U.S. public policy or qualifies for any of the other relevant
exceptions enumerated in the New York Convention.
V
DIFFICULTIES IN USING IsLAMIc LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION CONTEXT
A. Determining Islamic Law
If an agreement calls for an arbitrator to simply apply Islamic law,
the arbitrator will face certain challenges regardless of whether the
arbitrator is an expert on Islamic law. Difficulties will inevitably arise
during the arbitration because multiple schools of Islamic law exist
and each of these schools has many interpretations. 69 Islamic law is
essentially 1,400 years of jurisprudential analysis of Islam's sacred
texts-mainly the Quran and Sunna (Prophet Muhammad's recorded
actions and sayings).70 Today, Islamic law is divided into two main
categories: the Sunni and Shi'a schools of law.71 Four Sunni schools
also continue to interpret Islamic law: Maliki, Hanbali, Hanafi, and
Shafi.72
Another problem arbitrators will confront when asked to apply
Islamic law is that the concept of binding precedent does not exist in
Islamic law.73 Islamic scholars, whose writings make up Islamic law,
constantly debate and change their opinions on the law. 4 Further-
66 See Col6n, supra note 58, at 411 (suggesting that the emergence of international
Islamic financial instruments may create conflict-of-law issues).
67 See Levi-Tawil, supra note 6.
68 See Col6n, supra note 58, at 412 (referencing U.S. providers of Islamic financial
products).
69 See Charles P. Trumbull, Note, Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting Islamic
Legal Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 609, 626-28 (2006).
70 See id.
71 See Arthur J. Gemmell, Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East, 5 SANrA
CLARAJ. INT'L L. 169, 172 (2006).
72 See Trumbull, supra note 69, at 627-28.
73 See id.
74 See Kutty, supra note 23.
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more, Islamic law has no real choice-of-law concept.7 5 Therefore, par-
ties who choose Islamic law will face uncertainty during the arbitral
proceedings, as Islamic law not only has many interpretations, but
these varying interpretations are also in constant flux.
B. The "Laws of a Country" Versus "Rules of Law" and
Proceedings "Not in Accordance with the Agreement of
the Parties"
A British case, Shamil Bank of Bahrain E. C. v. Beximco Pharmaceuti-
cals Ltd., raises an interesting choice-of-law issue in commercial arbi-
tral proceedings where the arbitrator applied Islamic law.76 In Shamil
Bank, the court held that an agreement calling for the application of
Islamic law was invalid because Islamic law is not the law of any one
country.77 The court based its decision on the 1980 Rome Conven-
tion on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (the Rome
Convention),'7 8 which requires parties to choose the law of a particular
country.79 The following question is raised: Should an arbitrator re-
fuse to honor the parties' choice of Islamic law on the basis that Is-
lamic law is a religious code and not the legal system of any one
nation? Many nations have incorporated Islamic law into their legal
systems, but it is difficult to single out any one of these countries and
hold it as a true example of Islamic law.80
The Rules of Arbitration Article 17 of the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC) and Article 28 of the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law's Model Law on International Arbitration
(Model Law) provide an alternative approach to the Rome Conven-
tion.81 The ICC and Model Law take the "rules of law" approach, al-
lowing parties to choose to apply a body of law that is not necessarily
codified by any governing body or state. 2 Nevertheless, even if the
parties to an arbitration adopt the ICC and Model Rules approach,
the difficult problem of recognizing and enforcing an arbitral award
75 See id.
76 [2004] EWCA (Civ) 19, [2004 1 W.L.R. 1784 (appeal taken from Eng.).
77 See Col6n, supra note 58, at 414.
78 June 19, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1492.
79 See Col6n, supra note 58, at 414-15.
80 For example, Iran and Saudi Arabia have applied Islamic law to "all areas of law."
Fatima Akaddaf, Application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries: Is the CISG Compatible with Islamic Law Princi-
ples?, 13 PACE INT'L L. REv. 1, 22 (2001). Nevertheless, Iran and Saudia Arabia's national
laws differ: the former adheres to Shi'a Islamic law and the latter to Sunni Islamic law. See
Abdulaziz H. Al-Fahad, Ornamental Constitutionalism: The Saudi Basic Law of Governance, 30
YALEJ. INT'L L. 375, 386 n.45 (2005) (stating that Sunni Islam influences the Saudi order).
81 See VARADY ET AL., supra note 1, at 652-54 (4th ed. 2009).
82 See id.
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applying a religious law with contradictory and evolving interpreta-
tions still lies before the court.
The fact that Islamic law consists of many schools of thought cre-
ates another vulnerability for a foreign arbitral award using Islamic
law at the recognition and enforcement stage. Article V(1) (d) of the
New York Convention states that a court may refuse recognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award where the law used during the pro-
ceedings "was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or,
failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the
country where the arbitration took place."8 3 Hence, if at the recogni-
tion and enforcement stage the losing party objected to recognition
and enforcement on the basis that the version of Islamic law chosen
was not the law the parties intended, then the U.S. court may hold the
arbitral award invalid on Article V(1) (d) grounds under two justifica-
tions. First, the U.S. court might find that the law the arbitral author-
ity applied was not the version of Islamic law chosen by the parties,
such that the law applied "was not in accordance with the agreement
of the parties."84 Second, the U.S. court might decide that the parties'
choice of Islamic law was too vague to constitute an agreement regard-
ing the governing law. The court may instead choose to apply the law
of the country where the arbitration occurred.
VI
THREE ALTERNATIVES A REVIEWING U.S. CouRT MAY EMPLOY
WHEN CONFRONTED WITH A FOREIGN ARBITRAL
AWARD RENDERED USING IsLAMIc LAW
A. Per Se Ban on Recognition and Enforcement
Under a per se ban, U.S. courts would automatically refuse to
recognize or enforce a foreign arbitral award rendered using Islamic
law for the procedural, substantive, evidentiary, or arbitral law.85 Pro-
ponents of a per se ban might justify such a rule on the basis that
Article V(2) (b) of the New York Convention allows a court to set aside
an award if "recognition or enforcement of the award would be con-
trary to the public policy of [the forum] country"8 6 or, in other words,
if the award offends the "forum state's most basic notions of morality
and justice."8 7 The proponents of such a ban would contend that a
court's recognition and enforcement of such an award is against U.S.
public policy and against the United States' "most basic notions of
83 See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(1) (d).
84 Id.
85 See VARADY ET AL., suprT note 1, at 654-55, 657 (4th ed. 2009).
86 See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(2) (b).
87 See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
505
CORNELL LAWREVIEW
morality and justice" because Islamic law is fundamentally inconsistent
with American principles of secularism, due process, and equal
protection.88
The argument that such an award is automatically contrary to
U.S. public policy is unpersuasive. In Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co.
v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit read the New York Convention's pub-
lic policy exception "narrowly" and held that it is not "a parochial de-
vice protective of national political interests."89 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit further elaborated on the public policy
standard by explaining that a foreign arbitral award is contrary to U.S.
public policy when enforcement "tends clearly to undermine the pub-
lic interest, the public confidence in the administration of the law, or
security for individual rights of personal liberty or of private prop-
erty."90 According to these standards, a foreign arbitral award ren-
dered using Islamic law will not contravene U.S. public policy by the
mere choice of Islamic law. The fact that certain aspects of Islamic law
might be wholly contrary to U.S. ideals concerning individual rights
and the administration of law (e.g., a woman's testimony equaling half
of a man's testimony) does not necessarily imply that any award apply-
ing Islamic law is automatically contrary to U.S. public policy. Indeed,
substantive Islamic financial law seems entirely compatible with U.S.
public policy.9' Islamic substantive financial law emphasizes that par-
ties to a commercial transaction should not charge interest (7iba) nor
undertake excessive risk (gharar).92 Such pronouncements seem far
88 See, e.g., Saudi Arabia Execution of "Sorcery" Woman Condemned, TELEGRAPH (U.K.),
Dec. 13, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiarabia/895
2641/Saudi-Arabia-execution-of-sorcery-woman-condemned.html (discussing international
condemnation of Saudi Arabia's execution of a woman convicted of "sorcery" under Sharia
law).
89 See Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 974. In regards to foreign judgments ren-
dered by foreign courts, Karen Minehan explains that U.S. courts have applied the public
policy exception to only a few unique classifications of cases. See Karen E. Minehan, The
Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis?, 18 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 795, 804-08 (1996). These cases include: (i) a foreign judgment that
awarded damages incurred as a result of wrongdoing by the party seeking enforcement
from a U.S. court, where a wrongdoer or fugitive asks for enforcement, (ii) a foreign libel
judgment that is inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution, and (iii) penal foreign judgments.
See id.
90 TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting
Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
91 See generally Akaddaf, supra note 80 (explaining how the United Nations Conven-
tion on Contracts for International Sale of Goods-to which the United States is a party-
and Islamic commercial law are compatible).
92 See Robbins, supra note 63, at 1127 (discussing the basic principles of Sharia
finance).
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from offending any of the United States' "basic notions of morality
and justice."95 Hence, a per se ban would be extremely overbroad.
Christian and Jewish legal codes also contain certain laws con-
trary to U.S. public policy, but courts and politicians have recognized
that despite some areas of tension,94 arbitrations that employ religious
law have a very important purpose: they provide willing participants a
binding dispute resolution mechanism that employs a legal code con-
sistent with the participants' religious beliefs.95 The same logic ap-
plies to arbitrations rendered using Islamic law. Even though certain
aspects of Islamic law are contrary to U.S. public policy, allowing will-
ing parties to choose Islamic law as the applicable arbitration law en-
courages these parties to resolve their disputes civilly and in
accordance with their beliefs.
Problematically, a per se ban would contravene the political ques-
tion doctrine, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Equal Protection
Clause. A state court would also violate the Supremacy Clause and the
federal foreign affairs doctrine if it were to impose a per se ban on
foreign arbitral awards rendered using Islamic law.96
If a court were to institute a per se enforcement ban on arbitral
awards rendered using Islamic law, the court would violate the politi-
cal question doctrine. Montr6 Carodine argues convincingly about
the political question doctrine in regards to recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments (as opposed to foreign arbitral awards-
the focus of this Note). 7 She asserts that when a U.S. court contem-
plates enforcing a foreign court's decision, the court engages in an
"international due process analysis," which entails judging whether
the foreign nation's judicial system is "fundamentally fair."98 Using
this analysis, the court decides whether the country's judicial system is
93 See Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 974.
94 See Grossman, supra note 20, at 178, 181 & n.111, 189 (providing examples of such
tension, including the Institute for Christian Conciliation, which retains the power to deny
parties their right to an attorney, and "strict Jewish law," which does not allow women,
non-Jews, relatives of the parties, or the disabled to act as witnesses); Sharia in the West:
Whose Law Counts Most?, supra note 47 (implying that the presence of arbitral centers apply-
ingJewish law or Christian law in the United States is not as controversial as the prospect of
Islamic arbitral centers in the United States).
9 See Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating
Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1231, 1276-77 (2011); Sharia in the West: Whose
Law Counts Most?, supra note 47.
96 Cf Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968) (striking down an Oregon statute
that limited foreign citizens' inheritance of U.S. citizens' property to those who could
prove that their country provided reciprocal rights to U.S. citizens).
97 See Montr6 D. Carodine, Political Judging: When Due Process Goes International, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1159, 1193-1207 (2007).
98 See id. at 1177, 1183-84 (explaining that the system under which the foreign deci-
sion was rendered need only be "'compatible with' American notions of due process" (quot-
ing Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000))).
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so "bad" that its judgments are per se unenforceable.99 Carodine ar-
gues that a court undertaking this analysis violates the political ques-
tion doctrine because such an analysis requires the judge to conduct
foreign policy.100 Foreign relations questions trigger the political
question doctrine.' 0 The Supreme Court, in Baker v. Carr, agreed
with this position. 02 In Baker, the Court held that questions involving
foreign relations are inherently political and beyond a court's prov-
ince.'0 3 Similarly, if a court were to institute a per se rule disallowing
enforcement of arbitral awards rendered using Islamic law, the court
would violate the political question doctrine. Such a violation would
occur because the court would have conducted foreign affairs byjudg-
ing an entire foreign legal code's validity rather than the validity of
the single proceeding in regards to a specific disputant.
One might argue that a court would not violate the political ques-
tion doctrine if it declared that Islamic law is contrary to U.S. public
policy because Islamic law is a religious code, not exclusively the law of
any one country. This argument follows the British court's logic in
Shamil Bank,' 04 but it is misleading because Islamic law is still a foreign
legal code and several countries use Islamic law as the foundation of
their legal system. 05 As such, if a U.S. court imposed a per se ban on
arbitral awards because the arbitrator applied Islamic law, the court
would essentially declare that several countries' legal codes are funda-
mentally contrary to U.S. public policy. This declaration contravenes
the political question doctrine.
A per se ban would also violate the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. Any law similar to the one passed in Oklahoma,
which forbids courts from enforcing judgments rendered using Is-
lamic law, would violate the Free Exercise Clause. 0 6 Such a per se
99 See id. at 1170-89 (comparing court decisions that find a country's judicial system
to be "bad" without examining particular due process concerns of the case at hand with
court decisions that find a country's judicial system to be "good").
100 See id. But see UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION Acr § 4(a) (1962)
(implying that it should not matter whether the individual process provided by a foreign
court to a party in rendering a single foreign judgment was unfair but whether the foreign
legal system, as a whole, is unfair).
101 See Carodine, supra note 97, at 1197-1203 (noting that the Supreme Court recog-
nizes that questions involving foreign relations are inherently political).
102 See 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (arguing that cases involving foreign relations provide
traditional indicators of political questions).
103 See id.
104 See supra Part V.B.
1os See generally Akaddaf, supra note 80 (citing Saudi Arabia and Iran as countries that
universally apply Sharia law).
106 See Symeonides, supra note 50, at 321-22 (citing Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111
(10th Cir. 2012)).
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ban "singl [es] out" Islamic law for disparate treatment in violation of
the Free Exercise Clause.1 07
Similarly, a state court would violate the federal foreign affairs
doctrine by imposing a per se ban on the enforcement of foreign
awards rendered using Islamic law.108 In Zschernig v. Miller, the Su-
preme Court held that a state court cannot apply state laws which have
the effect of managing relations with another country because foreign
relations is the exclusive province of the federal government-specifi-
cally the President and Congress.' 09 Consequently, a state court's per
se recognition and enforcement ban would amount to a state passing
judgment on an entire foreign legal code.
A state court that applies a state law imposing a per se ban on
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral law would violate the
Supremacy Clause. Such a court would be refusing recognition and
enforcement on a ground not listed as an exception under the New
York Convention." 0 Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law con-
trols when state law contradicts federal law."' The state court's decla-
ration that the mere use of Islamic law is grounds for refusal would
violate the Supremacy Clause because the New York Convention is
federal law incorporated into the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act,"i2 and
a foreign arbitral award that merely uses Islamic law is not an enumer-
ated ground for withholding recognition and enforcement. 3
B. Per Se Enforcement or Minimal Review
Under a per se enforcement or minimal review approach, a court
would simply enforce an arbitral award or conduct a very limited re-
view of the award. In practice, courts take this approach when recog-
nizing and enforcing a foreign award under the New York
Convention." 4 When a party seeks to enforce a foreign arbitral award
under the New York Convention, the court does not examine the mer-
its of the dispute and can only refuse recognition and enforcement on
a few grounds." 5
107 See id. The law is facially discriminatory because although it forbids courts from
referencing any foreign law, it mentions only Sharia as an example.
108 See Carodine, supra note 97.
109 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
110 See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V.
111 Crosby v. Nat'1 Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
112 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of
1970 (Federal Arbitration Act), Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006)).
113 See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V.
114 SeesupraPartl.
"5 See Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948, 960 (S.D. Ohio
1981) (agreeing that the court, acting under narrow powers of judicial review, cannot sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the arbitrators); Mark Wakim, Public Policy Concerns Regarding
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The per se enforcement or minimal review approach gives rise,
however, to a number of issues. For example, many scholars argue
that a court's recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award
amounts to state action. 1  If state enforcement of an arbitral award is
truly state action, then enforcing an arbitral proceeding that lacked
due process protections would create constitutional violations under
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.117 Thus, if parties chose Is-
lamic procedural law to govern a dispute and if the arbitrator ex-
cluded several witnesses with material testimony because they had an
interest in the outcome, then state enforcement of the award might
be unconstitutional given that the parties did not have a full opportu-
nity to present their case.118 Similarly, if the parties agree that only
Muslims can serve as arbitrators, then a simple per se enforcement of
the award would violate constitutional protections such as the Equal
Protection Clause.' 19 Another problem would stem from some inter-
pretations of Islamic law stating that the testimony of a woman is half
that of a man's.120 This interpretation creates issues under the Equal
Protection Clause and Article V(1) (b) of the New York Convention,
under which a state court would likely note that material evidence was
disallowed and the arbitration failed to provide an adequate opportu-
nity to present the case.121
A British court directly confronted the problem of enforcing a
domestic arbitral award that resolved a financial dispute where the
arbitration agreement stipulated that the arbitrator must be a mem-
ber of a specific sect of Shi'a Islam.12 2 In fivraj v. Hashwani, the losing
party objected to enforcement on the grounds that the award's recog-
Enforcement of Foreign International Arbitral Awards in the Middle East, 21 N.Y. IN-r'L L. REv. 1,
24-25 (2008) (listing the grounds for refusal of an award under the New York Convention
and noting that an exception based on the erroneous application of substantive law is not
listed as a reason for withholding recognition and enforcement).
116 See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 20, at 199-202; Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice:
Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 577, 579
(1997).
117 See Grossman, supra note 20, at 202-03.
118 The test for procedural due process examines whether a court deprived a party of
his or her constitutionally guaranteed right to life, liberty, or property without due process.
See id. To determine whether a due process right exists, the court must balance the party's
interest affected by the procedure in question with the possibility of an 'erroneous depriva-
tion" of using the procedure in question against the government's interest in keeping the
current procedure in place. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
119 The state's discrimination on the basis of religion, without a compelling govern-
ment interest, amounts to an equal protection violation. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,
434-35 (1991).
120 See supra Part II.B.
121 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (finding that discrimination on the basis of
sex is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
122 Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2011] UKSC 40, [1] (appeal taken from Eng.); Pierre M.
Gaunaurd et al., Islamic Finance, 45 Tr'L LAw. 271, 271-72 (2011).
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nition and enforcement would violate the English Equality Regulation
(EER), which prohibits private parties from discriminating on the ba-
sis of religion in the employment context.'23 The English Court of
Appeals held that the award violated the EER and was invalid. 124 This
case, however, should not be held up as a paradigmatic example of
the incompatibility of an arbitral proceeding's incorporation of Is-
lamic law and call for a Muslim arbitrator with Western notions of
dispute resolution and equal protection. 125 The EER includes an ex-
ception permitting religious discrimination where "being of a particu-
lar religion or belief is a genuine occupational requirement." 26
Additionally, the fivraj Court decided the dispute under English sub-
stantive financial law; the parties did not need a Muslim arbitrator
proficient in Islamic law because the dispute did not involve issues
relating to substantive Islamic financial law. 127 When an arbitral
clause calls upon an arbitrator to apply Islamic commercial law, the
issue remains open as to whether the arbitral award is invalid because
the parties did not allow non-Muslims to act as arbitrators.
Nevertheless, the per se enforcement or limited review approach
might be inconsistent with the state action doctrine. In Shelley v. Krae-
mer, the Supreme Court famously held that the enforcement of a ra-
cially discriminatory covenant amounted to state action and
constituted a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."28 Although
the Court's state action jurisprudence is not entirely clear or consis-
tent, in Georgia v. McCollum, the Court attempted to enunciate a stan-
dard for determining when private acts constitute state action. 129
Under this McCollum standard, the right that a plaintiff claims the
state infringed upon must be a right provided by the government,130
and the alleged infringer must be "properly described as a state ac-
tor."' 3 1 Richard Reuben argues that a court's enforcement of an arbi-
tral award is state action because the government is highly involved in
encouraging the growth and effectiveness of the dispute resolution
process, of which arbitration is a part.'32 He also posits that arbitra-
tors perform a traditional government function: they resolve disputes
involving the application of law to facts.' 33 Reuben analogizes a
123 fivraj, [20111 UKSC 40, [1], [6]-[7).
124 See Gaunaurd et al., supra note 122, at 272.
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 See id. at 271-72.
128 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
129 See 505 U.S. 42, 50 (1992) (questioning whether the defendant's use of a peremp-
tory challenge constituted state action).
130 Id. at 51.
131 See Grossman, supra note 20, at 199.
132 See Reuben, supra note 116, at 579, 628-29.
133 See id. at 619-25.
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court's enforcement of an arbitral award to a private attorney's use of
preemptory challenges during voir dire. 1 3 4 In Batson v. Kentucky, the
Supreme Court found that a private attorney's use of preemptory
challenges to dismiss jurors on the basis of race amounted to state
action and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.1 35 State recog-
nition and enforcement of an arbitral award, however, involves at least
just as much state action because an award rendered by a private arbi-
trator is in effect approved by the state, and the state will use its au-
thority to recognize and enforce the award.' 3 6
If a court's recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral
award is correctly classified as state action, then per se enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards rendered using Islamic law becomes problem-
atic.'3 7 For instance, if an arbitration excluded material evidence be-
cause a party's key witness has some interest in the outcome of the
arbitration, a U.S. court's recognition and enforcement of the award
would violate that party's due process rights. If the parties ask an arbi-
trator to apply Islamic law and the arbitrator then interprets Islamic
law as denying the right to representation during the arbitral proceed-
ings, a U.S. court's recognition and enforcement of such an award
might violate the due process rights of the party who sought represen-
tation. Furthermore, if the parties ask the arbitrator to apply Islamic
law and the arbitrator interprets Islamic law as dictating that a
woman's testimony equals half of a man's testimony, then a U.S.
court's recognition and enforcement of such an award might violate
the Equal Protection Clause. 38 A similar equal protection problem
would exist if the parties chose their arbitrator on the basis of religion
and a U.S. court recognized and enforced such an award. In sum, a
134 See id. at 626.
135 See 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
136 See Reuben, supra note 116, at 627-29 (discussing the various roles a court plays in
the arbitration process).
137 If recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is correctly considered state ac-
tion, then all faith-based arbitrations might be in jeopardy. In the education context, the
Supreme Court stated that "a State may not delegate its civic authority to a group chosen
according to a religious criterion" and that "taluthority over public schools belongs to the
State ... and cannot be delegated to a local school district defined by the State in order to
grant political control to a religious group." Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690-96, 698 (1994). An interesting question to ask is whether the
same logic applies to binding arbitration where the dispute resolution function of the gov-
ernment is turned over to a religious institution.
138 The question of whether a losing party would have standing, on equal protection
grounds, to challenge an award rendered where the losing party's female witness's testi-
mony was given half the weight of a male's testimony is irrelevant at the recognition and
enforcement stage. The losing party's standing to challenge on equal protection grounds
would be irrelevant because the losing party would challenge the finding that a female
witness's testimony given half the weight of a male witness's testimony violates the Equal
Protection Clause, which is U.S. public policy. See New York Convention, supra note 5, art.
V(2) (b).
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U.S. court's per se ban on recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award, depending on the interpretation of Islamic law used, may lead
to equal protection or due process violations.139
C. Intermediate Level of Reviewability
Another approach U.S. courts can take is an intermediate level of
review for constitutional violations. If a court reviewed an arbitral
award rendered using Islamic law for due process or equal protection
violations, the court could easily violate the First Amendment's Estab-
lishment Clause. Some scholars argue that one advantage of using
Islamic law is that it has many interpretations, meaning that a court
could adopt an interpretation that would uphold an award without
violating the forum country's public policy or fundamental notions of
justice. 140 Yet, if a U.S. court employs this intermediate level of re-
viewability, it would effectively be choosing a specific interpretation of
a religious legal code as correct, which U.S. courts are not permitted
to do under the First Amendment.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court held that state action is
permissible only if it "has a secular purpose," "does not have a primary
effect of promoting or inhibiting religion," and "does not excessively
entangle the government with religion."l 41 Thirty-two years later, in
Jones v. Wolf' the Court established the neutral principles test for the
religious question doctrine. 142 In Jones, the Court stated that a court
can make "no inquiry into religious doctrine" when confronted with a
dispute involving religious issues;' 4 3 a court can decide a dispute that
involves religious elements, but if the court must examine religious
issues to resolve the dispute, the court should not hear the case.144
Thus, when a party asks a U.S. court to withhold recognition and en-
forcement because the arbitrator excluded material evidence by
adopting a putatively wrongful interpretation of Islamic evidentiary
law, the court should refuse to inquire into whether the interpretation
was wrong under Islamic law. This approach avoids a First Amend-
ment violation. Apparently, a court must either examine Islamic law
139 A court attempting to find an interpretation of Islamic law that would avoid a due
process or equal protection violation would be violating the First Amendment's Establish-
ment Clause. See infta Part VI.C.
140 See Kutty, supra note 23, at 618-21 (explaining how certain aspects of Islamic law,
which might be contrary to "modern institutions and customs," can be interpreted differ-
ently); Almas Khan, Note, The Interaction Between Shariah and International Law in Arbitration,
6 Cn. J. INcr'L L. 791, 794-97 (2006).
141 Trumbull, supra note 69, at 616 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971), affd, 411 U.S. 192 (1973)).
142 See 443 U.S. 595, 602-05 (1979).
143 Id. at 603 (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God
at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (per curiam)).
144 See id. at 602-05.
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to determine if a constitutional violation occurred during the arbitra-
tion stage and, in so doing, violate the First Amendment's Establish-
ment Clause, or refuse to examine Islamic law and possibly violate the
objecting party's constitutional rights.
VII
A THREE-STEP APPROACH FOR RECOGNIZING AND ENFORCING
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AwARDs RENDERED
USING RELIGIOUS LAW
The next Part of this Note suggests an approach that U.S. courts
ought to take when asked to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral
award rendered using religious law, as distinguished from the ap-
proaches discussed above that they may be authorized to take. The sug-
gested approach focuses on Islamic law but applies to all religious law,
notjust Islamic law, as a court's application of the suggested approach
to only Islamic law would constitute a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
A. Separability
Separability is a familiar arbitration doctrine that the Supreme
Court adopted in Pima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Co.145 Under the doctrine of separability, an arbitral clause is separate
from the container contract in which it appears.146 According to this
doctrine, a contract as a whole may be invalid, but the arbitral provi-
sion in the same contract can still be valid and enforceable (and vice
versa). 147 The separability doctrine allows an arbitrator to apply sepa-
rate legal codes to the container contract and the arbitral clause. 148
Although developed in the context of preserving the validity of
arbitral clauses,149 a court could also use the separability doctrine to
confront the issues involved in enforcing an arbitral award rendered
using Islamic law (or any other religious law). Arbitral proceedings
may employ different laws for different aspects of the dispute. Theo-
retically, the parties can choose a different law for the merits of the
dispute, the procedure and evidence, the arbitration clause, and the
arbitral law.o50 Given this wide latitude, an enforcing court must first
consider the part of the arbitration to which Islamic law applied. If
the parties chose Islamic law to govern the merits of the dispute, the
court should not review the arbitrator's application of Islamic law. Re-
145 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967); see VARADY ET AL., supra note 1, at 95-96.
146 See VARADY ET AL., supra note 1, at 101.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 402-04; VARADY ET AL., supra note 1, at 95-96.
150 See VARADY ET AL., supra note 1, at 654-55, 657 (4th ed. 2009).
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viewing courts generally do not review the merits of disputes (the facts
and the application of law to facts),1'5 and there is little in Islamic
financial substantive law that would create due process or equal pro-
tection concerns. 52
B. Waiver
If Islamic law was the law chosen to govern the procedure, eviden-
tiary rules, or arbitral law, then the reviewing court should ask
whether the party objecting to recognition and enforcement has
waived its right to object.153 If a party did not object to the arbitra-
tion's use of Islamic or any other religious law for evidentiary rules,
arbitral rules, or procedural rules, then the enforcing court should
not permit that party to raise these issues during the enforcement
stage.
A possible counterargument to this waiver approach is that it ig-
nores the state's interest in ensuring that enforcement of arbitral
awards does not violate constitutional law or U.S. public policy. The
New York Convention has seven exceptions under which a court can
refuse recognition and enforcement of a foreign award.154 A court,
however, can only raise an exception on its own motion under two
circumstances: the public policy exception and the nonarbitrability of
subject matter exception. 55 Therefore, one can argue that a private
party does not have the exclusive right to waive its constitutional pro-
tections because allowing a court to enforce an award that offends
notions of due process and equal protection contravenes U.S. public
policy.'56
U.S. courts, however, have been comfortable allowing parties to
waive constitutional rights in arbitral proceedings. In Barnes v. Lo-
151 See Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948, 960 (S.D. Ohio
1981); Wakim, supra note 115, at 21-22, 24-25.
152 See generally Peter M. Hoffman & Lindsee Gendron, judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards After Cable Connection: Towards a Due Process Model, 17 UCLA Er. L. REV. 1, 3-4
(2010) (noting that U.S. courts have upheld arbitration awards even when they violate
American principles of due process); Laura Belkner, Note, The Secular and Religious Legal
Framework of Afghanistan as Compared to Western Notions of Equal Protection and Human Rights
Treaties: Is Afghanistan's Legal Code Facially Consistent with Sex Equality, 20 CARDOZO J. INT'L
& Comp. L. 501, 534-35 (2012) (arguing that provisions regarding the protection of wo-
men in Afghanistan's constitution, a legal document largely influenced by Islam, are
facially consistent with U.S. notions of equal protection). Substantive Islamic law is distin-
guished from Islamic procedural, evidentiary, and arbitral law on the basis that the latter
types are where the tension exists between Islamic law and Western notions of due process
and equality. See supra Parts II, VI.A.
153 See supra Part V.B.
154 See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V.
155 See id. art. V(2).
156 See Grossman, supra note 20, at 204.
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gan,'5 7 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took the view
that "a party [can] waive[ ] any claims based on its right to due pro-
cess of law under. . . the United States Constitution."' 5 8 Additionally,
in the international commercial arbitration context, parties are typi-
cally sophisticated entities. 5 9 Michael Grossman's duress argument-
that parties might be coerced into accepting arbitration where relig-
ious law is applied because of community pressure-is inapplicable in
the international commercial arbitration context where parties are
generally state actors or other corporate entities familiar with the legal
process.o60 Therefore, international commercial arbitration will likely
not infringe upon the constitutional rights of a vulnerable or unknow-
ing party.
C. Procedural Due Process and Equal Protection Analysis in
Limited Cases
When an arbitration employs Islamic law (or any other religious
law) for the procedural, evidentiary, or arbitral laws and the party
fighting enforcement has objected during the arbitral proceedings,
then the court should conduct a due process analysis to determine
whether the arbitration provided the objecting party a full and fair
opportunity to be heard and whether notions of equal protection
rights were honored. This approach would require courts to closely
examine the procedures applied during the arbitral proceedings. Pe-
ter Hoffman and Lindsee Gendron offer a list of criteria that an arbi-
tral proceeding must satisfy in order for courts to recognize and
enforce domestic arbitral awards consistent with due process. 6 1 Hoff-
man and Gendron posit that an arbitral tribunal must give adequate
notice to the parties, must allow the parties to "defend and present"
their cases, must let the parties confront opposing witnesses, and must
ensure that the parties have the right to an arbitral proceeding that is
"free of racial or other actionable prejudice."162 Although Hoffman
and Gendron's criteria concern domestic arbitral awards and not for-
157 122 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 1997).
158 See Hoffman & Gendron, supra note 152, at 3.
159 See Khan, supra note 140, at 792. See generally Brower & Sharpe, supra note 4 (dis-
cussing nation-states and corporate entities as the participants in international commercial
arbitration).
160 See Khan, supra note 140, at 798-99.
161 Hoffman & Gendron, supra note 152, at 36-37.
162 See id. Hoffman and Gendron also suggest that the defending party has the right to
have the complaining party carry the burden of proof. See id. at 37. This requirement is
inconsistent with Islamic procedural law. Under Islamic procedural law, the claimant is
not always the party with the burden of proof. Instead, the party deemed to have the
weaker case is the claimant and the party with the stronger claim is the defendant. See
Helfand, supra note 95, at 1265-66. Whether Islamic procedural law's method of assigning
the burden of proof is consistent with basic notions of due process in the United States is
beyond the scope of this Note.
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eign ones, a court can employ the same criteria when deciding
whether a foreign arbitral award that uses religious law meets basic
constitutional requirements.
One might argue that conducting a due process analysis of for-
eign arbitral awards is exactly the type of "international due process
analysis" that violates the political question doctrine.163 Yet, because a
U.S. court engaging in a due process analysis would not examine Is-
lamic law as a legal system to determine if it is consistent with notions
of due process or equal protection, but would instead examine the
individual arbitral proceeding to determine if due process and equal
protection rights were met, this kind of analysis of foreign arbitral
awards would not violate the political question doctrine.
Critics of this approach might argue that a U.S. court's due pro-
cess analysis of a foreign arbitral award is contrary to the New York
Convention. The critics might also argue that the New York Conven-
tion enumerates specific exceptions to recognition and enforcement,
and inconsistency with a country's constitution is not one such excep-
tion. Furthermore, critics can challenge this approach by pointing
out that conducting due process and equal protection analyses of for-
eign arbitral proceedings is absolutely contrary to the purpose of the
New York Convention and will impose costs on international commer-
cial transactions. The purpose of the New York Convention is to facili-
tate cross border transactions by allowing courts of member countries
to recognize and enforce resolutions of commercial disputes of an in-
ternational character regardless of national boundaries. 64 Further-
more, critics may contend that if U.S. courts take an approach that
scrutinizes foreign arbitral awards rendered using Islamic law, they
will discourage Muslim states and other Muslim entities from investing
their Islamic financial assets in the United States. The critics will as-
sert that a court's constitutional analysis is essentially relitigation of
the case-the very outcome the New York Convention and arbitration
mean to avoid.' 6e
Critics of the due process and equal protection analysis approach
are correct in pointing out that it is somewhat inconsistent with the
New York Convention. These critics, however, ignore the Supreme
Court's finding that the U.S. Constitution trumps international trea-
163 See Carodine, supra note 97, at 1190-91.
164 See Levi-Tawil, supra note 6, at 612-14; see also Kutty, supra note 23, at 570 (discuss-
ing additional benefits of international commercial arbitration, including the parties' free-
dom and flexibility regarding choice of arbitrators, location of arbitration, procedural
rules, and governing substantive law).
165 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984) ("Such a course could lead to
prolonged litigation, one of the very risks the parties, by contracting for arbitration, sought
to eliminate.").
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ties and international laws when these sources of law conflict. 66
Therefore, because enforcement of an arbitral award is state action,'67
if enforcement of a foreign arbitral award will infringe on constitu-
tional due process or equal protection rights,'68 a U.S. court should
not enforce the foreign arbitral award. Furthermore, if a U.S. court
were to find that a foreign arbitral award rendered using Islamic pro-
cedural, evidentiary, or arbitral law violated U.S. notions of due pro-
cess or equal protection, then, in most instances, this finding would
qualify as contrary to U.S. public policy-an exception under New
York Convention Article V(b) (2).
The criticism that the due process and equal protection analysis
approach will impose costs on cross border transactions involving Is-
lamic financial assets and discourage Muslim states and entities from
investing these assets is unnecessarily alarmist. The constitutional
analysis approach will not impose costs on international commercial
transactions involving Islamic financial assets because two conditions
must be satisfied before a court will even conduct the due process and
equal protection analysis.' 69 First, the U.S. court has to find, that the
arbitration employed Islamic law for the procedural, evidentiary, or
arbitral law.' 70 Second, the court must find that the party raising the
objection to the use of Islamic law in regards to the procedural, evi-
dentiary, or arbitral law at the recognition and enforcement stage
raised the same objection during the arbitral proceedings.'71 Only
after these two requirements are met will a court determine if the arbi-
tral proceeding was consistent with due process and equal protection.
Still, an uncomfortable dilemma exists with this approach: How
can a U.S. court decide whether Islamic law, as applied during a for-
eign arbitration, is consistent with due process and equal protection
without implicating the First Amendment's Establishment Clause?
Grossman implies that courts have two mutually exclusive options in
regards to recognition and enforcement of domestic arbitral awards
where religious law is applied. The court can choose to "examine
some religious doctrine" for constitutional violations (and thereby
contravene the Establishment Clause by interpreting religious doc-
trine) or recognize and enforce an award without examining it for
constitutional violations (in order to avoid violating the Establishment
Clause). 72 Grossman concludes that courts should pass judgment on
166 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (plurality opinion) ("This Court has regu-
larly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty.").
167 See supra Part VI.B.
168 See supra Parts II, VIA.
169 See supra Part VI.A.
170 See supra Part VIA.
171 See supra Part V.B.
172 See Grossman, supra note 20, at 208-09.
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the constitutionality of arbitral proceedings where religious law is ap-
plied in order to protect individual due process rights, and he accepts
that in so doing, a court would technically violate the Establishment
Clause.' 73
Grossman, however, creates a false dichotomy. It is unnecessary
to concede that protecting individual due process rights at the recog-
nition and enforcement stage of an arbitral proceeding where relig-
ious law is used and preserving the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause are mutually exclusive. Under the neutral principles test estab-
lished in Jones v. Wolf a court cannot inquire into religious issues in
order to resolve a dispute. 1 7 4 Under step three of my suggested ap-
proach, a court would not inquire into the workings of Islamic law to
see if the arbitral proceeding was consistent with due process and
equal protection; the court would merely ask whether the arbitral pro-
ceeding itself, which used Islamic law, was consistent with due process
and equal protection. In other words, the court would not ask
whether Islamic law is consistent with due process and equal protec-
tion or whether the arbitrator(s) applied Islamic law correctly; in-
stead, the court would ask whether the actual procedure used was
consistent with due process and equal protection.
For example, if an arbitrator interpreted Islamic evidentiary law
to hold that a party's material witness could not testify because the
witness had an interest in the outcome and at the recognition and
enforcement stage a U.S. court found that denying a party the ability
to present a material witness is a violation of the party's due process
rights, then refusing to recognize and enforce the foreign arbitral
award would not contravene the Establishment Clause. By contrast, in
the same scenario, the court would contravene the Establishment
Clause by holding that the arbitrator's interpretation of Islamic evi-
dentiary law led to a due process violation. Similarly, the court would
also contravene the Establishment Clause by holding that Islamic evi-
dentiary law's principle concerning a witness's interest in the outcome
of a dispute is contrary to due process. In the first example, the U.S.
court examines the arbitral proceeding and the actions of the arbitra-
tor for due process violations without inquiring into Islamic law. In
the latter two examples, the court analyzes the arbitrator's interpreta-
tion of Islamic law and whether a certain aspect of Islamic law is con-
trary to due process, respectively. Both of these latter two examples
violate the neutral principles test and consequently the Establishment
Clause. In the first example, even though the arbitrator justifies his
decision on the basis of religious law, the U.S. court does not examine
the arbitrator's rationale for his decision or use of religious law, just
173 See id.
174 See supra Part VIC.
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the arbitrator's decision itself. In the latter examples, the U.S. court
examines the arbitrator's rationale for his decision, which in this case
is based on religious law, and analyzes whether the religious law used
is consistent with the Constitution, respectively. As long as a court can
distinguish between an arbitrator's decisions and the effects of those
decisions (even if those decisions and effects resulted from an arbitra-
tor's application of religious law) from the religious law that led an
arbitrator to make those decisions, the court would not violate the
neutral principles test. Under this application of the neutral princi-
ples test, it is possible to protect a party's due process rights while at
the same time preserving the Establishment Clause's prohibition on
courts' religious inquiry.
CONCLUSION
International commercial arbitration is not simply just another
dispute resolution device. With the help of the New York Convention,
international commercial arbitration is a cross border mechanism that
connects people, nations, and business entities. It can facilitate trade
between private entities from countries that have little or no formal
relations with each other. A party from Israel and a party from the
Islamic Republic of Iran can arbitrate in the United Kingdom, and a
U.S. court can recognize and enforce the award rendered under the
New York Convention's enforcement-friendly rules.1 75
Uniquely, not only does international commercial arbitration
help increase the interconnectivity of parties from around the world
with little concern for national boundaries, but it also allows parties to
retain a sense of cultural, national, and religious identity by allowing
the parties to choose the law applied to the arbitration. Thus, interna-
tional commercial arbitration is a force that encourages globalization
but still respects cultural, religious, and national attachments. If this
duality is understood, international commercial arbitration can indi-
rectly ease global tensions that stem from national, cultural, and relig-
ious misunderstandings by harnessing commercial relations between
states and private entities from around the globe.
The issue of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards rendered using Islamic law in U.S. courts is sure to arise in the
near future. The growth of Islamic finance as an alternative to more
traditional forms of finance in the global marketplace will inevitably
lead parties to seek U.S. recognition and enforcement of foreign arbi-
tral awards rendered using Islamic law. When confronted with such
175 See VARADY ET AL., supra note 1, at 6-12 (listing Israel, Iran, the United Kingdom,
and the United States as countries belonging to the New York Convention).
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questions, U.S. courts must take a meticulously nuanced approach in
order to avoid a myriad of constitutional dilemmas.
In an attempt to avoid these constitutional dilemmas, this Note
offers a three-step approach for U.S. courts with regards to recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards rendered using relig-
ious law. First, courts should use the doctrine of separability to
determine whether the arbitration applied religious law to the sub-
stantive law of the dispute or to the procedural, evidentiary, or arbitral
law of the dispute. Second, if the arbitration employed Islamic or any
other religious law for the procedural, evidentiary, or arbitral law,
then the court should examine whether the objecting party at the rec-
ognition and enforcement stage also objected during the arbitral pro-
ceedings. Third, if the party did object during the arbitral
proceedings, the court should conduct a due process and equal pro-
tection analysis of the arbitral proceedings. During the third step, the
court should be mindful not to pass indictment on any aspect of Is-
lamic or religious law or evaluate the arbitrator's interpretation of Is-
lamic or religious law. Instead, the court must merely evaluate
whether the arbitral proceedings violated due process or equal protec-
tion. This approach will allow a U.S. court to protect the due process
and equal protection rights of the parties and simultaneously advance
the dual advantages of international commercial arbitration: facilitat-
ing interconnectivity between private parties regardless of nationality
and allowing parties to retain their national, cultural, and religious
identities during the dispute resolution process.
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